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Abstract
We analyze the anatomy of IPO waves in China and Hong Kong and draw comparisons
with the US IPO cycles. The lead-lag relationship between IPO initial returns and IPO
volume observed in the US is absent in these two Asian markets. Similar to the US, IPO
volume in Hong Kong is sensitive to changes in market conditions and exhibits seasonal
variations. In sharp contrast, however, Chinese IPO activity is much less responsive to
past market returns and volatility. Surprisingly, hot markets still emerge in China, not
because of market forces as in the US and Hong Kong, but due to regulatory choices.
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1 Introduction
The center of gravity of initial public offering (IPO) activity has substantially shifted toward
Asia in the past two decades owing to a dramatic growth of Asian IPO markets. Exchanges
in China and Hong Kong have been instrumental in fuelling IPO markets in this region. In
1990, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) were
just being launched, whereas the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) was a small market
with only a couple of hundred firms listed. In a matter of twenty years, these three exchanges
grew to become major hives of IPO activity. In 2010, in terms of capital raised via IPOs,
the HKSE, the Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) Board of the SZSE, and the SSE were
globally ranked the first, third, and fourth respectively; and, in the same year, the SME Board
and ChiNext Board of the SZSE were the top two IPO markets in the world in terms of the
number of IPOs (Ernst & Young, 2011).
Notwithstanding the increasing significance of IPO activity in Asian markets, the literature
on IPO waves in Asia is much limited compared to the research that focuses on IPO activity
in the US and Europe. A deeper understanding of IPO activity in major Asian markets is not
only valuable in its own right but also relevant for the entrepreneurial finance literature. This
is because a country’s IPO market imposes externalities on its small businesses and its venture
capital industry. According to Black and Gilson (1998), a healthy IPO market is key to the
vitality of venture capital. Furthermore, successful IPOs help venture capitalists raise capital
for new funds (Gompers, 1996) who can then invest in new small businesses. Therefore,
studying IPO cycles in China and Hong Kong has broader implications for the strands of
literature that focus on entrepreneurship, venture capital industry, and IPO regulations in
these markets (see e.g., Cressy and Farag, 2014, Gannon and Zhou, 2008, and Jiang et al.,
2014).
This paper fills a gap in the literature by studying the anatomy of IPO waves in China
and Hong Kong, the two leading IPO markets in Asia.1 Given institutional and cultural
1We note that there is a separate and well-developed body of literature that studies IPO underpricing and
long-run performance in China (see e.g., Chan et al., 2004, Guo and Brooks, 2008, Tian, 2011, Lin and Tian,
2012, Fan et al., 2007, and Su and Brookfield, 2013) and Hong Kong (see e.g., Cheng et al., 2006, Dawson, 1987,
2
differences between Asian and Western markets, it is far from obvious whether or not IPO
wave patterns observed in Western markets will be present in China and Hong Kong as well.
Furthermore, if IPO waves in China and Hong Kong share some similar characteristics with
IPO waves in the US, this suggests that certain features of IPO cycles are robust to significant
variation in institutional and cultural differences. Finally, due to strong historical ties between
Hong Kong and the West (UK in particular), there are hypothesized differences between IPO
waves in Hong Kong and China despite the geographical and cultural proximities of these two
markets.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. Lowry and Schwert (2002) find that an
increase in the current level of IPO initial returns leads to an increase in future IPO volume
(number of firms going public). We hypothesize that such a lead-lag relationship cannot be
observed in China due to a distinct regulatory regime. Indeed, we find no evidence of the
lead-lag relationship in China (even after controlling for IPO market shutdowns). Surprisingly,
such a relationship is absent in Hong Kong as well. This suggests that the lead-lag relationship
between IPO initial returns and IPO volume is not robust to institutional differences in IPO
markets. Theory predicts that IPO volume is sensitive to changes in market conditions (Pa´stor
and Veronesi, 2005, Benninga et al., 2005, Yung et al., 2008), investor sentiment (Ljungqvist
et al., 2006), or both (Bustamante, 2012). However, in China, regulators exert substantial
control on IPO timing, which leads us to believe that IPO volume will not be as responsive
to changes in market conditions or sentiment as in the US or Hong Kong. Consistent with
this belief, there is no significant relationship between IPO volume and past market returns,
volatility, and valuations in China. The Hong Kong IPO market behaves very much like
the US IPO market, such that the IPO volume is related to past and future market returns
(not as strongly as in the US though), past changes in market volatility, and exhibits strong
seasonality (more so than the US). We also observe that while there was a significant drop
in US IPO volume following the Global Financial Crisis, IPO activity in China and Hong
Kong remained strong in 2009. Finally, we find that hot IPO markets emerge both in China
Leung and Menyah, 2006, McGuinness, 1992, and Yu and Zheng, 2012). However, this strand of literature
does not examine cyclicality of IPO activity in these two markets.
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and in Hong Kong. However, Chinese hot markets are mostly artifacts of regulatory decision
making, whereas those in Hong Kong tend to emerge following significant market run ups.
In China, firms that go public during hot markets raise substantially more proceeds than the
remaining IPO firms, which is consistent with the US evidence (Alti, 2006). Interestingly, hot
market IPOs in Hong Kong do not raise significantly more proceeds than other IPOs once
growth opportunities and industry effects are controlled for. This suggests that hot markets
in Hong Kong are more likely to be driven by improvements in growth opportunities and a
need for capital to invest in those opportunities, rather than market timing attempts (see e.g.,
Helwege and Liang, 2004, Lowry, 2003, and Pagano et al., 1998).
A few other studies explore hot IPOs or hot IPO markets in China or Hong Kong. Cheung
et al. (2009) and Agarwal et al. (2008) study IPO underpricing in China and Hong Kong
respectively. Both studies investigate whether or not IPO underpricing is related to how
hot the IPO is, which is proxied by the subscription rate for IPO shares. Agarwal et al.
(2008) report a strong relationship between initial returns and the level of oversubscription
in Hong Kong. Cheung et al. (2009), who control for pre-IPO market returns, find that
the relationship is strong in China during a particular period but is less strong outside that
period. In comparison to these two studies that focus on IPO underpricing at the firm level,
we investigate time-variation in average IPO underpricing at the market level. Clearly, the
correlation between subscription rates and initial returns suggests that the changes in the
average subscription rate over time are expected to exhibit a pattern that is similar to the
time pattern in initial returns documented in this study. Guo et al. (2010) use a Markov
regime switching model to search for hot and cold cycles in China. Our sample period only
partially overlaps with theirs, but, there is agreement within that overlapping period, such
that both studies identify a single hot market. It lasts from April to June 2004 in our study
and from April to August 2004 in theirs. Furthermore, Guo et al. (2010, p. 209) note that a
hot market between April 2000 and February 2001 “is triggered by encouraging regulations”,
which is consistent with our finding that hot markets are often triggered by regulatory actions
in China. A key difference between this study and Guo et al. (2010) is that we not only detect
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hot markets but also formally investigate the dynamic relationships between IPO volume,
underpricing, and market conditions.
The present paper contributes to the literature in a number of ways. To our knowledge,
it is the first to offer a systematic study of IPO waves in China and Hong Kong and to draw
comparisons with the US IPO cycles. Apart from shedding light on the characteristics of IPO
waves in two leading Asian markets, the paper shows that some of the stylized facts about US
IPO waves can be eradicated due to variations in the institutional framework. For example,
the lead-lag relationship between IPO initial returns and IPO volume does not survive when
we move from Western IPO markets to Asian ones. The paper also draws attention to the
fact that IPO volume on a global scale is more stable when changes in IPO volume are less
correlated between the US and Asian markets such as China and Hong Kong. Finally, the
paper highlights the impact of regulation on the nature of IPO activity and demonstrates
how IPO cycles are transformed when the regulatory regime changes. In particular, the weak
relationship between IPO volume and market conditions and the ongoing risk of IPO market
shutdowns jointly imply that a timely exit via an IPO continues to be a problem in China,
which extends the results in prior literature that deals with China’s venture capital industry
(Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003, White et al., 2005).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We discuss the theory on IPO cycles
and develop testable hypotheses in Section 2. Empirical results are presented in Section 3.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical background and hypotheses development
The cyclical nature of IPO activity is a well-established empirical regularity that is docu-
mented by Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975), Ritter (1984), Lowry and Schwert (2002), Lowry (2003),
and others. It is theoretically well founded as well. Pa´stor and Veronesi (2005) present a the-
ory for the formation of IPO waves. In their model, IPO waves emerge when market conditions
improve and many private firms exercise their real option to go public around the same time.
Yung et al. (2008) develop a model in which time-varying adverse selection leads to cycles in
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IPO initial returns. According to the IPO timing model of Benninga et al. (2005), going pub-
lic entails diversification benefits for entrepreneurs, but this comes at the expense of private
benefits of control that are lost after the IPO. Going public becomes optimal when cash flows
improve sufficiently, and IPOs cluster in time, since improvements in market conditions are
likely to boost cash flows of many private firms simultaneously. Furthermore, IPO waves are
more likely to be industry specific, since the correlation between the cash flows of two different
firms are likely to be higher when those two firms are in the same industry. Industry-specific
IPO waves are also predicted by Benveniste et al. (2002). On the other hand, Ljungqvist et al.
(2006) contend that hot IPO markets (periods with unusually high number of firms going pub-
lic) can also emerge as a result of investor overoptimism. Their model predicts positive initial
returns during hot markets. According to the IPO timing model of Bustamante (2012), hot
markets can emerge when expected profitability or investor optimism is high. Finally, Lowry
and Schwert (2002) show that the current level of IPO initial returns have predictive power
on the future level of IPO volume, but not vice versa. Such a relationship is likely to be
observed when positive information about IPO firms is only partially incorporated into offer
prices (Loughran and Ritter, 2002, Hanley, 1993) or when there are information spillovers
(Alti, 2005).
There is a common feature that underlies these theoretical models: IPO volume responds
to changes in market conditions, investor sentiment, or both. These predictions are empirically
supported in Western markets such as the US and UK. We anticipate that they will be
supported in Hong Kong as well, since the institutional setup of the Hong Kong IPO market
is heavily influenced by the UK IPO market. The methods of selling and allocating shares
are similar, such that Hong Kong IPOs often feature a placement tranche for institutional
investors and a fixed-price subscription tranche for retail investors. Overall, the level of IPO
activity is mainly driven by market forces; and, thus, we expect IPO waves and hot markets
in Hong Kong to resemble those in Western markets. However, we cannot expect the same in
China due to a highly distinct IPO process.
The key distinguishing feature of the Chinese IPO market from Hong Kong and the US
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is the level of regulatory interference. This stylized fact has been highlighted in the prior
literature (see e.g., Chan et al., 2004, Tian, 2011, and Lin and Tian, 2012, Liu et al., 2013).
Especially in 1990s, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) exerted full control
on the IPO activity. For example, IPO volume was regulated under a quota system, such
that the CSRC decided the total number of new shares to be issued annually, which was then
allocated to regions in China. Furthermore, offer prices were set according to strict formulas
based on earnings multiples and were typically too low as the price-to-earnings multiplier
was artificially capped. Pricing caps on IPO shares, coupled with retail investor enthusiasm
for IPO shares led to astronomical levels of initial returns in 1990s. Starting from around
the year 2000, the regulator gradually and partially loosened its control. The quota system
was abolished and underwriters were allowed to recommend firms that desire an IPO to the
CSRC. Bookbuilding mechanism was introduced to facilitate price discovery and to allow for
more flexibility in setting offer prices.
Nonetheless, the CSRC still plays a major role in shaping both the level and nature of
IPO activity in China. A firm cannot go public without approval from the CSRC, even if it
satisfies the listing requirements. The review process undertaken by the CSRC is long and can
be subject to political biases.2 A clear manifestation of the CSRC’s continuing strong hold
on the IPO activity is market closures. Within the sample period of this paper, the Chinese
IPO market was shut down by the CSRC on several occasions. For example, following a
period of poor stock market performance, the CSRC intervened and closed the IPO market
in September 2008 for approximately 10 months. More recently the IPO market was closed
during the last quarter of 2012 and an IPO hiatus ensued throughout 2013. The CSRC’s close
involvement with the Chinese IPO market leads us to the following two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: There is no lead-lag relationship between IPO initial returns and
2When the CSRC published for the first time the list of firms waiting for an IPO approval, the list exceeded
500 firms (“China publishes full list of IPO applicants for 1st time”, Reuters News, February 2, 2012). There
are suggestions that the waiting period is substantially longer for private firms compared to state-controlled
ones (“Beijing Plans to Loosen Control Over IPO System”, Wall Street Journal Online, November 17, 2013);
and some studies suggest that foreign VC-backed issuers are at a disadvantage compared to issuers backed
by domestic VCs that are politically better connected (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003, Humphery-Jenner and
Suchard, 2013, and White et al., 2005)
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IPO volume in China.
Hypothesis 2: IPO volume is less sensitive to changes in market conditions in
China than in the US and in Hong Kong.
The motivation behind Hypothesis 1 is as follows. Lowry and Schwert (2002) argue that
releases of positive information about IPO firms (i) result in an increase in the current level of
initial returns, and (ii) cause more private firms to file for an IPO, which leads to an increase
in the number of future IPOs. In China, this is unlikely to happen, due to the uncertainty
over the length of the IPO process. Once a firm decides to go public, the time it takes until
the firm finally conducts its IPO is highly uncertain. The firm joins a long queue of firms
waiting to go public. The review process is long and the firm may not obtain the CSRC’s
approval at the end (see Footnote 2). Furthermore, even if the firm’s application is approved,
there is some risk that the IPO could be delayed further if the CSRC decides to suspend IPO
activity.
The uncertainties over approval and timing motivate Hypothesis 2 as well. Theory pre-
dicts a higher IPO volume following improvements in market conditions (see e.g., Pa´stor and
Veronesi, 2005). However, in China, an improvement in market conditions would result in
(i) a longer queue of firms waiting for an approval to go public, and (ii) only a fraction of
firms obtaining the approval. Both of these factors are likely to severe the link between IPO
volume and market conditions in China.
Hot markets commonly emerge in the US (see e.g., Ritter, 1984 and Helwege and Liang,
2004). Given that IPO activity in Hong Kong is driven by market movements, we expect to
observe hot markets there as well. However, it is not obvious whether or not hot markets are
likely to emerge in China. On one hand, the CSRC ensures that IPOs come to the market at
regular intervals, which effectively smooths out IPO volume. On the other hand, it suspends
IPO activity time to time, which can lead to a burst of IPOs when the market reopens.
Furthermore, the launches of the SME Board and ChiNext fall within our sample period.
These events are likely to cause an unusual hike in IPO volume, which can be significant
enough to result in the formation of hot markets. Therefore, our final hypotheses are stated
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as follows.
Hypothesis 3a: Hot IPO markets do not emerge in China as the IPO volume is
smoothed out by regulatory actions.
Hypothesis 3b: Hot IPO markets emerge in China due to IPO market closures
and to launches of new segments.
In the following section, we describe the data and test the hypotheses developed in this
section.
3 Tests
3.1 Data
We form a list of newly-listed firms in China and Hong Kong from official factbooks annually
published by the SSE, SZSE, and HKSE. The list includes all new listings between 1999 and
2013. From this list, we drop cross listings, introductions, and transfers, ending up with
2,706 IPOs, which constitute the final sample. The list also excludes investment companies
(unit trusts, closed-end funds, REITs) and is based on operating firms. Factbooks provide
the name, ticker, listing date, offer price, number of shares issued, and amount of proceeds
raised for each IPO firm. Furthermore, factbooks published by the SSE and SZSE provide
the issuing date and closing price on the first day of trading as well. For Hong Kong IPOs,
we obtain the first-day closing price from Datastream and the prospectus date from Perfect
Information.
We also collect data on IPO activity in the US to draw comparisons with China and Hong
Kong. In particular, we obtain the monthly time series of (net) IPO volume and IPO initial
returns in the US from Jay Ritter’s website.3 Both time series are based on a sample of IPOs
that exclude investment companies. Therefore, IPOs in the US sample are comparable to
those in the Chinese and Hong Kong samples.
3http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipoisr.htm
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Table 1 provides a breakdown of our sample by year and by market. The SZSE consists
of three segments: (i) Main Board, (ii) the SME Board (launched in 2004), and (iii) ChiNext
(launched in 2009). The HKSE contains two segments: (i) Main Board, and (ii) Growth
Enterprise Market (GEM) (launched in 1999). Both ChiNext and GEM aim to attract smaller
businesses that are typically in a high-technology industry. There is substantial time variation
in IPO volume in all markets. The level of IPO initial returns in Hong Kong is not too different
than in the US. On the other hand, Chinese IPOs yield much higher initial returns, which is
a stylized fact that is well documented in the literature (see e.g., Chan et al., 2004). However,
panel B of Table 1 reveals a clear time pattern in China. Initial returns are much lower
in recent years (starting from 2009) compared to the earlier years of the sample period. It
suggests that as market forces start to play a bigger role in the determination of IPO prices,
initial returns are converging to levels observed in the more mature IPO markets such as the
US.
[Please insert Table 1 about here]
3.2 Relationship between IPO volume and IPO initial returns
Previous academic studies document a lead-lag relationship between IPO initial returns and
IPO volume in the US (Lowry and Schwert, 2002) and UK (Banerjee et al., 2013). Such
a relationship is expected if positive information about IPOs is partially incorporated into
offer prices (Loughran and Ritter, 2002, Hanley, 1993). The partial adjustment causes an
increase in the current level of IPO initial returns, whereas the positive information causes
more private firms to decide to go public and leads to an increase in the future level of IPO
volume, hence the lead-lag relationship between initial returns and volume.
The lead-lag relationship is unlikely to emerge in the Chinese IPO market. Once a Chinese
private firm decides to go public, it joins a long queue of firms waiting to conduct an IPO.
Given the uncertainties over the length of the review process and the approval decision, it is
unlikely that high initial returns will be followed by high volume. In contrast, we have no
reason why the lead-lag relationship would not emerge in Hong Kong.
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In order to investigate the existence of a lead-lag relationship between initial returns and
volume in China and Hong Kong, we conduct Granger causality tests similar to those in
Lowry and Schwert (2002). For the Chinese data, monthly IPO volume observations are
set to missing rather than zero during IPO market shutdowns. This is to ensure that the
results of tests for the existence (or lack thereof) of the lead-lag relationship are not driven
by suspensions of IPO activity. The findings are reported in Table 2. We begin by regressing
monthly IPO volume on its lagged values (Model (1)). In all three markets, we observe
persistence in IPO volume such that at least two of the three lags have positive coefficients
that are significant at the 10% level or lower, which is in line with Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975).
Next, we regress monthly IPO volume on lagged values of monthly average IPO initial return
(Model (2)). As pointed out by Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975), an OLS specification leads to
error terms with substantial serial correlation. Therefore, we run a Cochrane-Orcutt model
that explicitly corrects for autocorrelation in residuals.4 In Hong Kong and the US, all
three lags of IPO initial return have positive coefficients and in both markets one of these
coefficients is statistically significant at the 5% level or lower. In contrast, in China, only
one of the coefficients is positive and furthermore the positive coefficient is not statistically
significant at a conventional level. Model (3) combines the covariates in Models (1) and (2).
We are particularly interested in the incremental explanatory power of lags of initial returns on
volume after controlling for lags of volume. In the US, the positive coefficient of R−1 remains
statistically significant at the 10% level and a Granger F -test rejects the null hypothesis that
lags of initial returns jointly have no power to predict volume. In China and Hong Kong, we
fail to reject the null at the 10% level of significance. Therefore, the evidence suggests that
periods of high initial returns lead to periods of high volume in the US, but not in China and
Hong Kong. In Model (4), we reach the same conclusion after controlling for any potential
seasonality in volume.5 In Models (5)-(8), the dependent variable is initial returns. In Model
4For example, in the case of China, the OLS specification results in a Durbin-Watson d-statistic of 0.73,
which is substantially lower than the no-autocorrelation value of 2. Running the Cochrane-Orcutt model leads
to a large improvement, such that the transformed d-statistic takes a value of 2.37, which is much closer to the
value of 2.
5Helwege and Liang (2004) note that US IPO volume is seasonally low during January and September.
Yung et al. (2008) find that the US IPO market is a lot more active in the fourth quarter compared to the first
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(5), we regress monthly average IPO initial return on its lagged values. In all markets the
coefficients of lags are positive and some coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%
level, which is again consistent with Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975). In Model (6), a Cochrane-
Orcutt model is run (for the same reason as in Model (2)) by regressing initial returns on
lags of volume. The coefficients tend to have negative signs and none of them are significant
at the 5% level. Model (7) combines the covariates in Models (5) and (6). We test for the
joint predictive power of lags of volume on initial returns. In none of the markets, the null
hypothesis of no power is rejected at a conventional level. This conclusion stays the same
after controlling for any potential seasonality in initial returns (Model (8)).
[Please insert Table 2 about here]
Overall, our findings indicate that past levels of IPO volume are not helpful in forecasting
future levels of average IPO initial return. However, in the US, past levels of average IPO
initial returns are useful in forecasting future levels of IPO volume. This is the lead-lag rela-
tionship between initial returns and volume first documented by Lowry and Schwert (2002).
In contrast, we find no evidence of such a relationship in China and Hong Kong. In Hong
Kong, there is a positive relationship between current volume and past initial returns (Model
(2)), but the relationship loses its significance once past volume is controlled for (Models (3)
and (4)). Similarly, in China, no significant relationship between current volume and past
initial returns remains once past volume is controlled for. The absence of the lead-lag rela-
tionship in China is consistent with Hypothesis 1, but its absence in Hong Kong is surprising.
This suggests that the lead-lag relationship is not an inherent feature of IPO markets, but is
sensitive to the institutional framework and market environment.
3.3 Relationship between IPO volume and market conditions
There is ample evidence in the literature that IPO volume fluctuates substantially over time.
Rational explanations of swings in IPO volume include time variation in market conditions
(Pa´stor and Veronesi, 2005) and in adverse selection (Yung et al., 2008). On the other hand,
quarter. Similarly, Banerjee et al. (2013) find that UK IPO volume is lower in the first and third quarters.
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some studies suggest that IPO volume rises (and hot markets emerge) when private firms time
the market to issue cheap equity (see e.g., Pagano et al., 1998, Helwege and Liang, 2004, and
Alti, 2006).
While the link between IPO volume and market conditions is well documented for Western
markets such as the US (see e.g., Pa´stor and Veronesi, 2005), UK (Banerjee et al., 2013),
Italy (Pagano et al., 1998), and France (Derrien, 2005), Asian markets have so far received
less attention. Therefore, we investigate whether or not IPO volume is sensitive to changes in
market conditions in two major Asian IPO markets. We expect a strong link in Hong Kong,
since its institutional setup is similar to the UK IPO market and since IPO activity is mainly
driven by market factors. In contrast, given that regulatory actions play an important part
in determining IPO volume in China, we anticipate that the link will be weaker there.
Pa´stor and Veronesi (2005) model the optimal time for a private firm to exercise its
option to go public and argue that, given a cohort of private firms waiting to go public, many
private firms will exercise their option around the same time, which results in the creation
of an IPO wave. In particular, their model predicts that IPO volume will be (i) positively
related to prior market returns, (ii) negatively related to subsequent market returns, and (iii)
negatively related to current and past changes in market volatility. On the other hand, if
changes in IPO volume are driven by market timing attempts, we expect to see more firms
going public following higher valuations in the market as argued by Pagano et al. (1998) and
others. Pa´stor and Veronesi (2005) provide evidence that while there is a positive relationship
between IPO volume and the lagged level of market valuations, which can proxy for either
growth opportunities or sentiment, the relationship disappears when lagged market returns
are controlled for. This is consistent with their model in the sense that IPO volume is more
sensitive to changes in market conditions, rather than levels.
In order to test whether IPO volume is sensitive to market conditions, we make use of
market indices constructed by Datastream (TOTMKCA for China, TOTMKHK for Hong
Kong, and TOTMKUS for the US). Datastream offers a total return index (symbol: RI) for
each market. We define RM as the monthly market return and calculate it as the difference
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between the levels of the total return index at the end of the current month and the previous
month divided by the level at the end of the previous month. σ is defined as the standard
deviation of daily market returns in a month. ∆σ is the change in the level of σ between the
current month and the previous one. P/B is the price-to-book value of the market index in
a particular month.
We examine the relationship between IPO volume and market conditions in a regression
framework. In particular, we run a series of negative binomial regressions that account for
the fact that IPO volume is count data. Moreover, like in Section 3.2, we control for IPO
moratoriums in China, such that months during which the Chinese IPO market was closed
are excluded from the analysis. Table 3 reports our findings. In Model (1), IPO volume
is regressed on past market returns. In the US, all three lags have positive coefficients and
two of them are statistically significant at the 5% level or lower. In contrast, none of the
lags is statistically significant at a conventional level in China. In fact, a Wald χ2 test fails
to reject the null hypothesis that regression coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero at
a meaningful level of significance. Hong Kong is in between China and the US, such that
two of the coefficients are statistically significant at 10% level, but with opposite signs. We
add control variables in Model (2) and contemporaneous and lead values of RM in Model
(3). In the US, the coefficients of past market returns remain significant in Models (2) and
(3). Furthermore, RM+2 has a negative coefficient that is significant at the 5% level, which
is consistent with Pa´stor and Veronesi (2005). In Hong Kong, there is a similar but weaker
pattern. The coefficient of RM−2 is positive and significant at the 1% level and the coefficient
of RM+2 is negative and significant at the 5% level. In China, none of the leads or lags of
RM are significant at the 5% level. In Model (4), as previously documented by Pa´stor and
Veronesi (2005), we observe a negative relationship between changes in the level of volatility
and subsequent IPO volume in the US. We find that the same relationship is also present in
Hong Kong, but not in China. In Hong Kong, the coefficients of the contemporaneous and
lagged values of ∆σ are all negative and two of the coefficients are significant at the 10% level
or lower. In China, some of the corresponding coefficients actually have a positive sign and all
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but one are not statistically significant at a conventional level. Finally, we test whether IPO
volume is related to the lagged level of the price-to-book value of the market index (Models
(5) and (6)). In the US, the lagged value of P/B has strong explanatory power on IPO volume
in the absence of competition from other covariates (Model (5)), but the relationship vanishes
once we add leads and lags of market returns and other controls (Model (6)). In Hong Kong,
there is no relationship even in the absence of other covariates (Model (5)). In China, there
is a negative relationship (Model (5)) that disappears in the full model (Model (6)).
[Please insert Table 3 about here]
The negative binomial models in Table 3 are appropriate models only if the count data
on IPO volume is overdispersed (i.e., the variance is greater than the mean). In the absence
of overdispersion, a Poisson model, which assumes that the variance is equal to the mean
is more appropriate. We conduct a standard likelihood-ratio test to investigate overdisper-
sion. In particular, the overdispersion parameter α must be equal to zero in the absence of
overdispersion. The tests firmly reject the null that α = 0 at the 1% significance level in all
models and in all three markets (see the last two rows in each panel of Table 3). Therefore, we
conclude that IPO volume is overdispersed, and it is appropriate to prefer negative binomial
models over Poisson ones.
In summary, the way IPO volume responds to changes in market conditions is similar in
Hong Kong and the US. As predicted by Hypothesis 2, we find no significant relationship
between IPO volume and changes in market conditions in China. Moreover, in both the US
and Hong Kong, there is strong evidence of seasonality, such that IPO volume is significantly
lower in the first and third quarters. In China, there is no evidence of lower IPO volume in
the third quarter and only weak evidence of a drop in IPO volume in the first quarter. This is
consistent with the idea that the CSRC smooths out IPO volume during a year and provides
additional support for Hypothesis 2. Finally, it is interesting to compare IPO volume in 2009
across the markets. The dummy variable Y 2009 takes the value of one (zero) if the monthly
observation is (not) in the year 2009. Following the Global Financial Crisis that reached a
peak in 2008, there is a significant contraction in US IPO volume in 2009. In contrast, there
15
is no significant change in IPO volume in Hong Kong during the same year. Most strikingly,
IPO volume is significantly higher in China in 2009, owing to the launch of ChiNext in that
year. Clearly, the strong performance of two major Asian IPO markets in 2009 mitigated the
drop in global IPO activity in that year. This is helpful for the resilience of IPO activity on
a global scale to the extent that shocks to Western and Asian IPO markets continue to have
a low correlation in the future.
3.4 Hot IPO markets in China and Hong Kong
Swings in time series of IPO volume and IPO initial returns create peaks of IPO activity,
which are known as hot IPO markets, or simply as hot markets. During a hot market, the
number of firms that go public exceeds normal levels. According to a stream of literature,
there are temporary windows of opportunity during which firms can raise equity cheaply
(see e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Many private firms conduct their IPOs during such
periods when investors are overoptimistic; IPO volume soars; and hot markets emerge as a
result (Loughran et al., 1994 Helwege and Liang, 2004, Alti, 2006, Ljungqvist et al., 2006).
Explanations of hot markets other than investor sentiment include industry clustering due to
bundling by investment banks (Benveniste et al., 2002), procyclical adverse selection (Yung
et al., 2008), many private firms exercising their real option to go public around the same
time (Pa´stor and Veronesi, 2005), and cycles in aggregate demand for equity capital (Lowry,
2003).
The method used to detect hot markets differs across studies, but the general approach
is as follows. First, the sample period is split into regular intervals such as months (Helwege
and Liang, 2004, Pa´stor and Veronesi, 2005, Alti, 2006), quarters (Yung et al., 2008, Banerjee
et al., 2013), or years (Bustamante, 2012). Then, the intervals are sorted on the basis of
number of IPOs. Finally, those intervals that are above a prespecified cutoff point (top 25%
of the distribution in Helwege and Liang, 2004 and Pa´stor and Veronesi, 2005, top 30%
in Bustamante, 2012, and top 50% in Alti, 2006) or that (substantially) exceed either the
historical average (Yung et al., 2008) or a moving average (Banerjee et al., 2013) are classified
16
as hot. Some papers deflate IPO volume to alleviate concerns about nonstationarity raised by
Lowry (2003), but Helwege and Liang (2004) show that the deflated time series is practically
the same with the original time series and the tests conducted by Ivanov and Lewis (2008)
provide no evidence of nonstationarity. Furthermore, some papers smooth the time series of
IPO volume (over three months in Helwege and Liang, 2004, Pa´stor and Veronesi, 2005, Alti,
2006 and four quarters in Yung et al., 2008) to address seasonality.
All of these methods with the exception of those employed by Yung et al. (2008) and
Banerjee et al. (2013) identify hot markets ex post and, therefore, are subject to a “look-
ahead bias”. Yung et al. (2008) address this issue by comparing IPO volume in each quarter
with IPO volume in past quarters only. While their method is powerful in terms of spotting
quarters that are “globally” hot compared to all past quarters, it lacks power to detect quarters
that are “locally” hot compared to more recent quarters. Banerjee et al. (2013) resolve this
issue by comparing IPO volume in each quarter with the IPO activity in the past five years.
In particular, they focus on the moving average of IPO volume in the past 20 quarters.
In this paper, we adopt an approach similar to those used by Yung et al. (2008) and
Banerjee et al. (2013). We divide our sample period into quarters and compare IPO activity
in each quarter with the activity in previous quarters. More specifically, we classify a quarter
as hot if the quarter’s IPO volume is greater than or equal to the maximum IPO volume of
the same quarters of the previous five years. This approach avoids a look-ahead bias and
is powerful to detect locally hot periods. Furthermore, it addresses the issue of seasonality,
since the first quarter of a year is compared only with the first quarters of previous years, the
second quarter only with the second quarters of previous years, and so on.
Our sample covers a 15-year period between 1999 and 2013, but we can only start identi-
fying hot quarters in 2004, since the method needs past five years’ data as an input. Further-
more, we take into account the IPO market closures in China, such that past five years’ data
is based on quarters during which the IPO market was open. Figure 1 illustrates hot quarters
(black bars) in China, Hong Kong, and the US between 2004 and 2013. We observe that
following the burst of the Dot-com Bubble, there has been a sharp drop in US IPO volume.6
6See Gao et al. (2013) for a study of the post-2000 IPO market in the US.
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Only three quarters in the US are identified as hot between 2004 and 2012, followed by a long
hot market in 2013 that emerged after a strong stock market performance in 2012. Overall
6/40=15% of the quarters are hot in the US between 2004 and 2013. Hong Kong is similar to
the US, such that 7/40=17.5% of the quarters are hot over the same period. Hot quarters are
mainly clustered between the second half of 2010 and the end of 2011. The average monthly
market return over the one-year period that precedes this cluster of hot markets is 4.4% com-
pared to an average of 0.7% during the remaining months of the sample period. The last
quarter of 2013 is also hot in Hong Kong, which coincides with a period of IPO moratorium
in China. In China, 8/40=20% of the quarters are classified as hot. The first hot quarter
is the second quarter of 2004, which is the quarter when the SME Board of the SZSE was
launched. The Chinese IPO market is also hot in the last quarter of 2009 and throughout
2010, which is mainly driven by the launch of ChiNext Board of the SZSE in late 2009.
[Please insert Figure 1 about here]
Overall, the findings suggest that hot markets emerge in China and Hong Kong at least
as often as they do in the US. In both Hong Kong and the US, hot markets follow strong
market performance, which is consistent with the theory. However, in China, hot markets
tend to coincide with the launches of new market segments, which suggests that they are
mostly artifacts of regulatory decision making as suggested by Hypothesis 3b.
3.5 The impact of a hot market on the amount of proceeds raised
There is evidence in the literature that firms raise more equity during hot markets. In partic-
ular, Alti (2006) finds that, after controlling for pre-IPO firm characteristics and the value of
growth opportunities at the time of going public, hot market IPOs raise substantially higher
proceeds than cold market IPOs. We examine whether the US findings extend to China and
Hong Kong as well.
The data on firm financials is obtained from Datastream. The set of variables we choose
is similar to the sets used by Helwege and Liang (2004) and Alti (2006) and includes variables
identified as important drivers of a firm’s financing choices in the prior literature (see e.g.,
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Rajan and Zingales, 1995). These variables are defined as follows. Assets and Sales are total
assets and net sales respectively. They are measured in millions of yuan (2013 purchasing
power) in China and millions of Hong Kong dollars (2013 purchasing power) in Hong Kong.
Profit is the profit margin, which is net income divided by net sales. Tan is asset tangibility,
which is net plant, property, and equipment divided by total assets. Debt is long-term debt
divided by total assets. MtoB is the market-to-book ratio, which is the market value of
common equity divided by the book value of common equity. All financials are based on the
fiscal year that is prior to the IPO year, except MtoB, which is based on the same fiscal year
as the IPO year. We follow Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Alti (2006), such that MtoB is
set to missing when it exceeds the value of 10. Pro is total proceeds divided by total assets.
Finally, our main variable of interest is Hot. It takes the value of one if a firm’s IPO took
place in a hot quarter and is equal to zero otherwise.
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for pre-IPO firm characteristics. The distribution
of Assets among firms that were listed on main boards of SSE, SZSE, and HKSE is highly
skewed. This is mainly driven by IPOs conducted by giant banks such as the Agricultural
Bank of China, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and the Bank of China, which
are among the largest IPOs in history. ChiNext and GEM attract smaller firms with lower
asset tangibility, less long-term debt, and higher market-to-book ratios. The average value of
Pro is particularly high for IPOs on the SME Board and ChiNext. Its level is more reasonable
for IPOs that take place on the main boards and is more in line with the US evidence provided
by Alti (2006).
[Please insert Table 4 about here]
In China, the median value of Pro is 1.33 for IPOs that take place in hot markets and
0.90 for the remaining IPOs. In Hong Kong, the corresponding figures are 0.66 and 0.50
respectively. In both markets, a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test rejects the null hypothesis
that the distribution of Pro is the same across hot quarters and the remaining quarters.
However, higher values of Pro observed during hot markets can be due to differences in
pre-IPO firm characteristics in general, and in growth opportunities (proxied by MtoB) in
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particular. To address this issue, we regress Pro on Hot and control for MtoB and relevant
firm characteristics. The results are reported in Table 5. In Models (1) and (2), we regress
Pro on Hot and on MtoB, respectively. In both China and Hong Kong, the coefficients
are positive as expected and are significant at the 5% level or lower. In Model (3), we again
regress Pro on Hot, but also control for pre-IPO firm characteristics. In China, the coefficient
of Hot remains significant at the 1% level, but in Hong Kong it is no longer significant at
the 5% level. Once MtoB is added (Model (4)), the coefficient of Hot loses its significance
in Hong Kong, but still remains significant at the 1% level in China. This suggests that the
higher level of Pro observed during hot markets in Hong Kong is mainly driven by better
growth opportunities firms have during those periods. On the other hand, in China, IPO
firms issue more equity in hot markets after controlling for growth opportunities as well as
pre-IPO characteristics. In Model (5), we control for the market segment in which the IPO
took place. This leads to interesting insights. In China, Pro is higher for firms listed on
ChiNext. Furthermore, the interaction variables suggest that IPO firms listed on ChiNext
and the SME Board raise more proceeds during hot markets, whereas those listed on Main
Boards of the SSE and the SZSE do not. This is consistent with our earlier finding that the
two of the hot markets in China coincide with the launches of the SME Board in 2004 and of
ChiNext in 2009. A potential explanation is that the overoptimism of investors during those
periods helped firms sell equity at higher prices.7 In Hong Kong, firms that go public on GEM
are associated with lower proceeds raised according to Model (5). However, this association
is not robust and disappears once industry fixed effects are added in Model (6). In China,
the interaction terms remain significant even after controlling for industry.
[Please insert Table 5 about here]
In general, the findings in Table 5 show that Chinese and the US hot markets share the
common characteristic that hot market IPOs raise substantially higher proceeds even after
7There was press coverage of substantially high amounts of proceeds raised by firms that went public on
ChiNext following the launch of this market segment in late 2009. For example, according to a news story
(“Shenzhen Tightens ChiNext IPO Rules — Start-Ups’ Excess Debut Proceeds for Limited Use”, Wall Street
Journal, January 7, 2010, p. C2), most of the early IPO firms on ChiNext raised more than double the amount
of proceeds they initially planned for.
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controlling for other determinants of equity issuance. Surprisingly, Hong Kong is distinct in
this sense, such that there is no significant difference between the amounts of proceeds raised
by hot market IPOs and the remaining IPOs once growth opportunities and industry factors
are accounted for.
4 Conclusion
IPO markets in China and Hong Kong have been growing at a rapid pace in the past 15 years.
As a result of their impressive growth over this period, these two major Asian markets have
earned their place among the most active IPO markets in the world in terms of the aggregate
amount of capital raised and the number of deals completed.
The literature has so far focused largely on underpricing and long-run performance of
IPOs in China and Hong Kong. This paper fills a gap in the literature by analyzing IPO
waves in these two markets. In particular, we make use of theoretical studies on IPO waves
to hypothesize in which ways the IPO cycles in China and Hong Kong are expected to be the
same as (or different from) those in the US. We then test our hypotheses using a large sample
of IPOs that took place in China and Hong Kong between 1999 and 2013.
Our findings suggest that the nature of IPO activity in Hong Kong has similarities with the
US. In particular, Hong Kong’s IPO volume is sensitive to changes in market conditions and
exhibits strong seasonality. In China, on the other hand, there is no significant relationship
between IPO volume and market returns or changes in volatility. This is not surprising given
the fact that Chinese regulators continue to have a strong influence on IPO activity in China.
The CSRC not only decides which firms go public and when but also exercises power to shut
down the IPO market when it deems necessary.
Prior literature reports a lead-lag relationship between IPO initial returns and IPO volume
both in the US and UK. In particular, an increase in the average level of IPO initial returns
leads to an increase in the future number of IPOs. We find no evidence of such a relationship
in China and Hong Kong, which suggests that the relationship is not robust to changes in the
institutional framework.
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We find that hot markets emerge in both China and Hong Kong. Those in Hong Kong
follow strong equity market performance. In contrast, hot markets in China tend to be driven
by regulatory choices. In particular, two of the Chinese hot markets coincide with the launch
of a new market segment. Furthermore, the fact that the CSRC can suspend IPO activity
up to a year or more suggests that a burst of IPOs can lead to a hot market when the IPO
market reopens.
There is evidence in the US that IPO firms raise substantially higher amounts of proceeds
during hot markets, even after controlling for pre-IPO firm characteristics and growth oppor-
tunities. We find that this evidence extends to China. In particular, firms that go public on
ChiNext and the SME Board raise significantly more proceeds during hot markets. This is not
the case in Hong Kong, such that growth opportunities and industry factors account for the
higher amounts of proceeds raised by firms during hot markets. Therefore, while the findings
in the US and China are consistent with the market timing hypothesis, results from Hong
Kong support the rational explanation that firms raise more proceeds during hot markets as
they need more capital to invest in better growth opportunities.
We also observe that IPO markets in Hong Kong and China were less affected by the
Global Finance Crisis compared to the US IPO market. In fact, after controlling for various
factors, Chinese IPO volume in 2009 was higher compared to other years as ChiNext Board
of the SZSE was launched in late 2009. To the extent that changes in IPO volume maintain
a low correlation across Western markets such as the US and Asian ones such as China and
Hong Kong, IPO volume can be expected to be more robust on a global scale.
Overall, our findings contribute to our understanding of IPO cycles, highlight the charac-
teristics of IPO waves observed in the US that are also present in China and Hong Kong, and
demonstrate how IPO activity varies across different regulatory regimes.
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Table 3: Relationship between IPO volume and market conditions
Tests are based on monthly time series of IPO volume in China, Hong Kong, or the US between 1999 and 2013. All models
are negative binomial regressions. The dependent variable is monthly IPO volume. RM is the monthly market return and
RM−i (RM+i) is the ith lag (lead) of RM . σ is the standard deviation of daily market returns in a month. ∆σ is the
change in the level of σ between the current month and the previous one and ∆σ−i is the ith lag of ∆σ. P/B−1 is the
price-to-book value of the market index in the previous month. Q1 (Q3) is a dummy variable with a value of one if the
month is in the first (third) quarter. Y 2009 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the month is in year 2009. α is the
overdispersion paramater, and the likelihood ratio test compares the negative binomial model to a Poisson model. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels respectively.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: China
RM−1 −0.23 0.69∗ 0.73∗ 0.79∗
(0.57) (0.39) (0.41) (0.41)
RM−2 0.12 0.45 0.51 0.57
(0.69) (0.50) (0.46) (0.48)
RM−3 0.66 0.94∗ 0.90∗ 0.97∗
(0.65) (0.52) (0.53) (0.53)
RM 0.09 0.04
(0.50) (0.50)
RM1 0.03 −0.02
(0.59) (0.57)
RM2 −0.58 −0.67
(0.52) (0.55)
RM3 −0.26 −0.30
(0.66) (0.67)
∆σ −10.44
(8.14)
∆σ−1 −2.96
(7.28)
∆σ−2 18.64∗
(9.55)
∆σ−3 12.05
(8.89)
P/B−1 −0.11∗∗ −0.03
(0.05) (0.05)
V−1 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
V−2 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.01∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
V−3 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Q1 −0.23∗ −0.23∗ −0.26∗∗ −0.23∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Q3 0.03 0.03 −0.03 0.02
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Y 2009 0.54∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.48∗ 0.55∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.20) (0.25) (0.20)
Constant 2.47∗∗∗ 1.63∗∗∗ 1.63∗∗∗ 1.68∗∗∗ 2.81∗∗∗ 1.74∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.16) (0.19)
Observations 140 122 122 122 140 122
Wald p-value 0.751 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 0.015 < 0.001
Log pseudolikelihood −477.032 −367.282 −366.477 −367.496 −475.526 −366.267
Likelihood-ratio test of α = 0:
χ2 value 482.23 51.75 50.17 58.28 463.35 48.89
p-value < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
33
Table 3 - cont’d
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel B: Hong Kong
RM−1 0.22 1.08 0.93 0.77
(0.93) (0.93) (0.96) (0.95)
RM−2 2.38∗∗∗ 2.43∗∗∗ 2.54∗∗∗ 2.45∗∗∗
(0.87) (0.86) (0.86) (0.87)
RM−3 −1.81∗ −1.19 −1.29 −1.44
(1.04) (0.97) (0.94) (0.96)
RM 0.13 0.29
(0.92) (0.95)
RM1 0.85 1.04
(0.91) (0.89)
RM2 −2.21∗∗ −1.98∗
(1.00) (1.04)
RM3 0.69 0.92
(0.91) (0.97)
∆σ −12.55
(11.24)
∆σ−1 −26.32∗∗
(10.92)
∆σ−2 −26.30∗
(13.88)
∆σ−3 −11.95
(12.13)
P/B−1 0.15 0.18
(0.17) (0.19)
V−1 0.03∗∗ 0.02∗ 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
V−2 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
V−3 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Q1 −0.69∗∗∗ −0.66∗∗∗ −0.76∗∗∗ −0.66∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.13)
Q3 −0.59∗∗∗ −0.59∗∗∗ −0.64∗∗∗ −0.59∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Y 2009 −0.13 −0.12 −0.15 −0.11
(0.28) (0.27) (0.32) (0.27)
Constant 1.73∗∗∗ 1.57∗∗∗ 1.60∗∗∗ 1.64∗∗∗ 1.50∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.31) (0.36)
Observations 180 177 174 177 180 174
Wald p-value 0.028 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 0.373 < 0.001
Log pseudolikelihood −494.512 −466.679 −452.089 −468.617 −498.472 −451.626
Likelihood-ratio test of α = 0:
χ2 value 230.51 135.42 119.09 141.03 250.53 118.82
p-value < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel C: United States
RM−1 4.74∗∗∗ 4.90∗∗∗ 5.41∗∗∗ 5.43∗∗∗
(1.83) (1.23) (1.26) (1.23)
RM−2 5.01∗∗ 4.42∗∗∗ 4.59∗∗∗ 4.81∗∗∗
(1.96) (1.18) (1.09) (1.13)
RM−3 3.34 2.02∗ 2.15∗∗ 2.46∗∗
(2.18) (1.08) (1.05) (1.07)
RM 4.15∗∗∗ 4.38∗∗∗
(1.24) (1.21)
RM+1 1.43 1.64
(1.21) (1.19)
RM+2 −2.40∗∗ −2.03
(1.23) (1.30)
RM+3 −1.59 −1.12
(1.14) (1.17)
∆σ −32.64∗∗
(13.64)
∆σ−1 −34.98∗∗
(14.66)
∆σ−2 −55.07∗∗∗
(12.82)
∆σ−3 −32.44∗∗
(12.98)
P/B−1 0.59∗∗∗ 0.12
(0.05) (0.09)
V−1 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
V−2 0.00 0.01∗ 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
V−3 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Q1 −0.37∗∗∗ −0.39∗∗∗ −0.43∗∗∗ −0.39∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11)
Q3 −0.28∗∗ −0.22∗ −0.46∗∗∗ −0.20∗
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
Y 2009 −0.85∗∗∗ −0.89∗∗∗ −0.92∗∗∗ −0.88∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.26) (0.33) (0.26)
Constant 2.39∗∗∗ 1.76∗∗∗ 1.71∗∗∗ 1.85∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 1.46∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.16) (0.21)
Observations 180 177 174 177 180 174
Wald p-value 0.005 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
Log pseudolikelihood −629.590 −546.516 −526.592 −548.827 −600.038 −525.898
Likelihood-ratio test of α = 0:
χ2 value 1, 206.87 331.63 238.45 288.70 549.87 222.38
p-value < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for pre-IPO firm characteristics
The statistics are based on a sample of 1,231 firms in China and 664 firms in Hong Kong that went public between
2004 and 2013. Assets and Sales are total assets and net sales respectively. They are measured in millions of
yuan (2013 purchasing power) in China and millions of Hong Kong dollars (2013 purchasing power) in Hong Kong.
Profit is net income divided by net sales. Tan is net plant, property, and equipment divided by total assets. Debt
is long-term debt divided by total assets. MtoB is the market value of common equity divided by the book value of
common equity. It is set to missing when it exceeds the value of 10. Pro is total proceeds divided by total assets.
All financials are based on the fiscal year that is prior to the IPO year, except MtoB, which is based on the same
fiscal year as the IPO year.
Assets Sales Profit Tan Debt MtoB Pro
Panel A: China
Main Boards of the SSE and the SZSE
mean 141,900.10 15,685.59 0.12 0.33 0.08 2.63 0.60
p25 945.03 739.35 0.06 0.15 0.00 1.83 0.32
median 2,170.11 2,122.26 0.10 0.29 0.03 2.33 0.52
p75 6,824.82 6,047.15 0.15 0.51 0.13 3.11 0.80
count 172 172 172 171 172 164 172
SME Board of the SZSE
mean 1,058.65 1,197.50 0.14 0.30 0.05 3.85 1.11
p25 399.27 356.35 0.08 0.17 0.00 2.54 0.59
median 611.46 631.71 0.12 0.29 0.00 3.49 0.93
p75 1,051.09 1,136.66 0.17 0.40 0.08 4.82 1.44
count 655 655 655 650 655 605 655
ChiNext Board of the SZSE
mean 401.40 353.86 0.21 0.22 0.03 3.77 2.16
p25 223.53 183.31 0.14 0.10 0.00 2.53 1.29
median 315.85 271.29 0.19 0.20 0.00 3.51 1.86
p75 471.73 421.33 0.27 0.32 0.03 4.56 2.69
count 354 354 353 354 354 306 354
Panel B: Hong Kong
Main Board of the HKSE
mean 77,807.17 16,433.15 0.12 0.28 0.08 2.21 0.93
p25 536.81 563.26 0.08 0.09 0.00 1.30 0.25
median 1,334.13 1,139.84 0.14 0.23 0.02 1.99 0.55
p75 5,389.57 3,243.00 0.22 0.42 0.13 2.75 1.05
count 563 564 552 563 559 434 563
GEM Board of the HKSE
mean 235.94 272.25 0.12 0.17 0.04 2.82 1.21
p25 65.10 65.54 0.07 0.03 0.00 1.68 0.38
median 146.15 149.78 0.14 0.13 0.00 2.33 0.62
p75 247.70 260.44 0.25 0.24 0.01 3.62 1.20
count 95 95 95 95 95 70 95
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Table 5: The impact of a hot market on the amount of proceeds raised
Tests are based on a sample of 1,231 firms in China and 664 firms in Hong Kong that went public between 2004
and 2013. All models are OLS regressions. The dependent variable is Pro, which is total proceeds divided by
total assets. Hot is a binary variable that takes the value of one if a firm’s IPO took place during a hot quarter.
Sales is net sales measured in millions of yuan (2013 purchasing power) in China and millions of Hong Kong dollars
(2013 purchasing power) in Hong Kong. Profit is net income divided by net sales. Tan is net plant, property,
and equipment divided by total assets. Debt is long-term debt divided by total assets. MtoB is the market value
of common equity divided by the book value of common equity. It is set to missing when it exceeds the value of
10. All financials are based on the fiscal year that is prior to the IPO year, except MtoB, which is based on the
same fiscal year as the IPO year. dSME, dChiNext, and dGEM are dummy indicators for firms listed on the
SME, ChiNext, and GEM Boards respectively. Model (6) includes industry fixed effects based on 3-digit SIC codes.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels
respectively.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: China
Hot 0.57∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ −0.07 0.06
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07)
Hot× dSME 0.41∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.09)
Hot× dChiNext 0.99∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.15)
MtoB 0.17∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ln(Sales) −0.23∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ −0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Profit 4.27∗∗∗ 4.36∗∗∗ 3.99∗∗∗ 4.89∗∗∗
(0.37) (0.39) (0.36) (0.42)
Tan −0.78∗∗∗ −0.71∗∗∗ −0.45∗∗∗ −0.45∗∗
(0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.21)
Debt −1.43∗∗∗ −1.39∗∗∗ −1.26∗∗∗ −1.01∗∗∗
(0.30) (0.30) (0.27) (0.32)
dSME 0.04 0.02
(0.06) (0.07)
dChiNext 0.33∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.10)
Constant 1.10∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 2.22∗∗∗ 1.84∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 0.34
(0.03) (0.07) (0.19) (0.21) (0.21) (0.52)
Observations 1, 181 1, 041 1, 174 1, 035 1, 035 1, 035
Adj. R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.45 0.47 0.54 0.58
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel B: Hong Kong
Hot 0.26∗∗ 0.21∗ 0.19 0.31∗∗ 0.12
(0.13) (0.12) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18)
Hot× dGEM −1.06∗ −0.91
(0.57) (0.82)
MtoB 0.38∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
ln(Sales) −0.20∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Profit 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.06∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03)
Tan −0.53∗∗ −0.28 −0.33 −0.01
(0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.47)
Debt −0.13 −0.48 −0.59 −0.22
(0.47) (0.52) (0.52) (0.72)
dGEM −0.24 −0.11
(0.34) (0.61)
Constant 0.89∗∗∗ 0.12 2.40∗∗∗ 1.66∗∗∗ 2.02∗∗∗ 2.07∗∗
(0.07) (0.15) (0.36) (0.42) (0.43) (0.81)
Observations 658 500 643 488 488 487
Adj. R-squared 0.00 0.10 0.07 0.16 0.18 0.16
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Figure 1: Hot markets in China, Hong Kong, and the US. Hot quarters (black bars)
are identified between 2004 and 2013. The quarters between 1999 and 2003 (empty bars) are
not classified as the method needs past five years’ data.
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